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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper studies various aspects of the optimal design of economic organizations in  
the context of a project selection model, where decisions are made by fallible 
managers regarding the adoption or rejection of investment projects. I analyze the 
role of marginal decision costs, and establish that the sequentia l decision architecture 
is a pair of probability thresholds, and a corresponding pair of majority rules that vary 
with the stage of project evaluation.  The paper also analyzes the adjustment in the 
minimum organizational size and the decision architecture as changes occur in the 
quality of the investment environment and managerial expertise.   
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1. Introduction 
In most economic organizations, matters of strategic importance and which involve 
significant risk are often decided by a team of decision-makers.   The proverbial saying that 
“plans fail for lack of counsel, but with many advisers, they succeed” recognizes that 
individuals may not always have access to all the relevant information or possess the right 
expertise to make correct decisions.  As a result, collective decision-making can potentially  
improve the quality of decisions as well as increase the chances of success of new 
organizational initiatives.   
 
This paper looks at the optimal design of economic organizations in the context of a 
project selection model, where decisions are made by fallible managers regarding the 
adoption or rejection of investment projects.  As is well-known, fallibility in decision-making 
may arise because individuals are limited in their training, ability or experience, and thus may 
not always make the correct decisions.  Errors in judgment occur even if all the pertinent 
information necessary for the decision are available , decision-makers are sincere, have no 
vested interests to act differently  and information is transmitted accurately.  Within the 
fallibility framework, this paper analyzes the various aspects of the optimal organizational 
design: the minimum organizational size, the optimal sequential decision rules, and the impact 
of changes in the quality of the investment environment and the managerial expertise on the 
optimal architecture. 
 
While earlier studies by Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001b), and Koh (1992a, 1992b, 
1994b) and (Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) considered specific sequential architectures in 
project evaluation and analyze their comparative properties, this paper considers the role that 
marginal decision costs play in the design of the organizational structure and establish the 
optimal sequential decision architecture.  The motivation for the focus on marginal decision 
costs is the observation that most organizations operate at full managerial capacity, in the 
sense all the available managerial resources are fully deployed in making production and 
investment decisions at any point in time. With a fixed pool of managerial expertise within  
the organization, managerial tasks often have to be prioritized and for each task taken up by a 
group of managers, another task will only be attended to later.  In order to utilize managerial 
time and expertise optimally, the allocation of managerial expertise at each point in time 
should recognize the marginal benefit of further deliberation on a decision versus the 
opportunity costs to the organization of doing so.  The opportunity costs include the impact of 
potential delay in managerial attention on other projects, but also potential monetary loss to 
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the organization, as in the case when first-mover advantage matters in making investment 
decisions – if the project under review is adopted by competitors – as well as the additional 
resources that would be deployed to continuing the evaluation before a decision is made on 
acceptance or rejection. 
 
A contribution of this paper to the literature is to characterize the optimal sequential 
decision architecture in the context of a project selection model, when the marginal decision 
costs are present.  When such marginal decision costs are absent, as may be the case when 
managerial expertise are not fully deployed or when the organization can access additional 
resources at no cost, the optimal decision rule takes the form of an optimal majority rule with 
full participation by all the decision-makers in the decision process.  This is the situation 
studied in the literature in the context of committee decision-making, and the results for 
optimal decision-making in fixed-size committees have been generalized and unified by Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1997).  Intuitively, when the decision process is sequential and marginal 
decision costs are positive, the optimal decision architecture includes the option to make the 
decision earlier, as the expected benefits of further deliberation may be out-weighed by the 
opportunity costs involved.  We provide a characterization of the optimal decision rule.  
 
The analysis in this paper is primarily concerned with sequential decision 
architectures that arise due to the presence of marginal decision costs.  There are other reasons 
that may give rise to sequentiality in decision-making; for instance when managers are not 
identical in abilities or hold different portfolios of responsibilities, a pre-ordering of the 
decision-makers in the process is central to decision-making efficiency.  In Section 6 of this 
paper, I shall comment briefly on the issue of heterogeneous managerial ability and its impact 
on the optimal sequential architecture. 
 
Related Literature 
There is an established literature on optimal group decision-making that face 
dichotomous choices. Some of the earlier important work include Nitzan and Paroush (1982, 
1984a, 1984b), Shapley and Grofman (1984), Gradstein and Nitzan (1988) and Heiner (1988).  
The recent literature emphasizing managerial fallibility that is related to this paper include 
Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997, 1998, 2001a, 2001b), Koh (1992a, 1992b 1993, 1994a) and 
Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, 1988). The recent research has studied two specific sequential 
architectures – the hierarchy and polyarchy. In a strict hierarchical review process, a project is 
rejected and the evaluation ends if one manager rejects the project. A project is only accepted 
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if the manager at the top of the hierarchy accepts it.  By contrast, in a polyarchical review 
process, a project will be given further chances within the organization if it is turned down, 
and will be accepted once one manager accepts it. Another decision structure that has been the 
subject of much research is the committee with an optimally derived majority decision rule .  
The committee architecture has been studied in Koh (1994a), Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997) 
and Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1988).  
 
Within the framework of the dichotomous-choice model, the literature has studied the 
comparative properties of these organizational architectures, as well as the conditions under 
which a particular architecture dominates the others in terms of the implications on the 
welfare of the organizations and the costs to the organization. Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001b) 
and Koh (1992b) noted that the optimality of the hierarchical or polyarchial structures hinges 
on stringent conditions regarding the quality of the investment environment and the 
evaluation expertise of the managers. Koh (1993) discussed the impact of first-mover 
advantage and market competition on the choice of decision architecture.  
 
The techniques used in this paper to characterize the optimal sequential architecture 
for economic organizations are familiar methods employed in the statistical decision literature 
in the determination of optimal stopping rules (see, for instance, Astrom (1970) and Degroot 
(1970)) and in design of sequential probability ratio testing (see, for instance, Bertsekas 
(1987)).   In the terminology of the statistical decision literature, the design of the sequential 
decision architecture we study in this paper is akin to determining the optimal stopping rule 
for a sequential sampling process when a choice has to be made between two hypotheses.  For 
the project selection problem at hand, there are two courses of actions to choose from when 
evaluation ends, and the types of potential errors that can occur are; Type I error when good 
projects are rejected, and Type II errors, when bad projects are accepted.  The analysis in this 
paper thus provides another example of the application of statistical decision theory to the 
study of the economics of organization.  
 
Organization of Paper  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the project selection model.  
Section 3 derives the optimal majority rule for an accept-reject decision, which forms part of 
the optimal sequential decision rule. When marginal decision costs are zero, this optimal 
majority rule is also the optimal decision rule for the organization.  Section 4 discusses the 
properties of the optimal organizational structure and analyzes the impact on the 
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organizational structure as the quality of the investment environment and the level of 
managerial expertise varies.  Section 5 derives the optimal sequential decision architecture, 
when marginal decision costs are positive, and discuss its implications.  Section 6 provides 
some concluding remarks. 
 
Summary of main results 
We present a summary of the results of the paper. In the project selection model, 
presented in Section 2, a project that is either good or bad is evaluated sequentially by 
managers who then vote to accept or reject the project.  Each additional evaluation incurs a 
constant marginal decision cost to the organization.  At each stage of the project evaluation 
process, the organization has to decide if the evaluation process should be completed by either 
accepting or rejecting the project or to proceed for further evaluation and incurring further 
organizational costs.  The objective of the organization is to determine an optimal sequential 
decision architecture that maximizes the expected payoff net of total decision costs.  
 
In Section 3, we analyze the decision to accept or reject the project when it has 
undergone a series of evaluation and show that this decision will be based on an optimal 
majority rule (given in Proposition 1) that varies with the stage of evaluation, the quality of 
the investment environment and the expertise of the managers.  This optimal majority rule  
forms part of the optimal sequential decision architecture, as by definition, the organization 
makes an “accept” or “reject” decision when the evaluation process were to reach maximum 
possible  number of reviews, as set by the size of the management organization.   
 
In Section 4, I discuss the quality of the organizational decision-making process.  
When the optimal organizational decision rule in Proposition 1 is implemented, the 
hierarchical or polyarchical decision architectures can be shown to be feasible architectures 
under particular conditions of the investment environment and managerial expertise 
(Propositions 2). The optimality of these architectures is discussed, and it is noted that in 
situations when the organizational size is constrained, the hierarchy or polyarchy architectures 
are general suboptimal structures, and will be dominated by a trivial decision to either always 
reject or always accept.   
 
Furthermore, in Proposition 3, I note that the optimal decision architecture is not 
strictly sequential in the sense that the evaluation process would begin with a single manager, 
and a decision is then made if the project should proceed for further evaluation.  Even if 
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marginal decision costs are zero, the investment environment and the quality of managerial 
expertise generally dictates a minimum organizational organization, denoted Mmin, which is 
greater than one.  The optimal decision architecture is to begin the decision process with an 
initial review by the team of Mmin, managers.  The intuition for this result is that generally, the 
quality of investment environment is not neutral, in the sense that there is often a natural bias 
to make only “accept” or only “reject” decisions if no evaluation is undertaken.  Thus, for 
project evaluation to be informative, a minimum number of evaluations must be undertaken if 
the decision process is not dominated by a naïve strategy of either always accepting projects 
or not always rejecting projects.   
 
Beginning with the initial review by the team of Mmin, managers in a committee 
setting, there are now three possible decisions at each evaluation stage : (1) accept the project 
and end the review process, (2) reject the project and end the review process, or (3) request 
for an additional evaluation.  In Section 5, I establish, in Proposition 5, that the optimal 
sequential decision architecture is characterized by two probability thresholds at each stage of 
evaluation: if the conditional probability that the project is good exceeds the upper probability 
threshold, the project will be accepted without further evaluation; similarly, if the said 
conditional probability is below the lower probability threshold, the project will be rejected 
and evaluation ends. Otherwise, an additional review is desirable. Corresponding to the pair 
of probability thresholds is a pair of sequential majority rules, one for acceptance and another 
for rejection. When marginal decision costs are positive, the minimum size of the 
organization, as presented in Proposition 2, will be larger, as the presence of positive marginal 
decision costs makes the naïve strategies of always accepting or always rejecting more 
attractive. In Proposition 6, I show that it is possible to recursively derive the optimal 
sequential majority rules, which define the range within which an additional project review is 
desirable . 
 
2.   The Model 
Consider an economic organization whose objective is to maximize the net expected 
payoffs from selecting and implementing investment projects, and faces the following 
investment environment: good projects yield a fixed payoff of pGA if correctly chosen and pGR 
if incorrectly rejected; bad projects yield a payoff of pBR if correctly rejected and pBA if 
incorrectly adopted.  Let the proportion of good projects be a, so that the proportion of bad 
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projects is (1 – a).1  We can think of a and (1 – a) as, respectively, the a-priori probabilities 
that a project is good or bad.  We require pGA > pGR and pBR > pBA.   Without loss of 
generality, we assume that pBR > pGR2.   
 
Project evaluation is to be carried out managers who can differentiate good projects 
from bad ones, but only imperfectly.  They make independent decisions to approve or reject 
projects but are otherwise identical in their expertise.  Let the probability that a manager will 
approve a good project be g, and the probability that he will approve a bad project be b.  
Expertise is modeled by requiring g > b.  Evaluation of the project is to take place 
sequentially and each evaluation incurs a constant marginal decision cost of C.  For the 
analysis later in the paper, define da º g/b measure the ability to discriminate good projects; 
correspondingly, dr º  (1 – b)/(1 – g) measure the ability to discriminate bad projects.  Since g 
> b, it follows that da  > 1 and  dr  > 1, so that the product da dr  = d  > 1.   
 
Let m be the number of evaluations to date. Furthermore, denote zi, i = 1, …, m, as an 
independent Bernoulli variable representing the outcome of the ith review: zi = 1 represents a 
positive vote and zi = 0 represents a negative vote. Let P(m, n) denote the posterior probability 
that a prospect is good after m inspections with n favorable reviews, where å
=
=
m
i
izn
1
.   The 
Bayesian updating of P(m, n) is represented by: 
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where P(0, 0) = a.  The formula for P(m, n) indicates that the decision at stage m – whether to 
accept or reject the project, or proceed for an additional evaluation – is based on the degree of 
agreement about the project’s quality, and not on the history of the evaluation and the 
particular order in which opinions were formed.  This is due to the assumption of identical, 
                                                 
1 The formulation of the model and the notation used in this paper can be recast 
straightforwardly into an equivalent setting shown in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997). 
2  Our analysis is equally applicable in both situations: (1) pGA > pBR ³  pGR > pBA; (2) pGA > 
pGR ³  pBR > pBA. 
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independent managerial expertise, so that P(m, n) is a sufficient statistic for the history of 
evaluation.  When managers are not identical in their abilities, the ordering of the managers 
and the resultant evaluation history would be important for the decision on each project.  
Since g > b, it is a routine matter to note the following relationships hold: (i) P(m, n+1) > 
P(m, n), (ii) P(m+1, n) < P(m, n), and (iii) P(m+1, n+1) > P(m, n).    
 
Examples of dichotomous choice problems within economic organizations occur in 
the selection of projects for R&D funding or the determination of startup companies for 
venture investment. In the model presented here, we can think of the investment environment 
– represented by the proportion of good projects ( a ) and the set of payoffs {pGA , pBR, pGR, 
pBA } facing an organization as either the same for all firms within the industry, or, perhaps, 
more realistically, specific to each firm. Using the venture capital industry as an illustration, 
top-tier venture firms typically receive a higher proportion of the better projects or ideas (with 
also higher expected payoffs if successful), while lesser-known firms receive a relatively 
larger proportion of weaker projects.  We may further generalize the setting to one where the 
a-prior probability of a project’s quality ( a ) is dependent on the originator of the project or 
the idea, based on the past track record of the originator.  This interpretation of the project-
selection setting is particularly applicable to the problem internal resource allocation. Within 
organizations, business divisions routinely present business proposals or projects for 
budgetary approval; this is typically accompanied by a risk-return study of the potential 
payoffs and downside risks.  Optimal decision-making in such a situation can be modeled as a 
project selection problem by the management team tasked to evaluate and decide on the 
merits of these competing proposals. 
 
3. The Decision to Accept or Reject  
Let M denote the organizational size, which sets the maximum possible  number of 
evaluations 3.  We begin by analyzing the decision to accept or reject the project at stage m ( = 
1, …, M) of the evaluation process.  Define Za(P(m, n)) and Zr(P(m, n)) to be, respectively, 
the expected payoff from accepting and rejecting the project after m evaluations, where         
 Za(P(m, n)) = P(m, n)pGA  + (1 – P(m, n))pBA                                                                                            ( 3 ) 
Zr(P(m, n)) =  P(m, n)pGR  + (1 – P(m, n))pBR 
                                                 
3  The fixed costs of hiring the M managers are incurred upfront, and so would not affect the 
determination of the optimal decision architecture.   
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Given our assumption of pGA ³  pBR > pGR > pBA, Za(p) is linear and increasing in p and Zr(p) 
is linear and decreasing in p. (See Figure 3 for an illustration.) 
 
Proposition 1: There exists a majority decision rule N(m) such that at stage m of the 
evaluation process, the project should be considered for adoption if the number of approvals 
exceeds N(m); otherwise, the project should be considered for rejection.   
 
The derivation of N(m) is straightforward. For the decision to accept (reject) at stage m to be 
the optimal course of action, we show that Za(P(m, n)) > ( < ) Zr(P(m, n)), which is equivalent 
to the condition that P(m, n) > ( < ) Qc  where  
BABRGRGA
BABRc
p-p+p-p
p-p
ºQ        ( 4 )  
Define g(m) as a function such that P(m, g(m)) = Qc.  Using the definition of P(m, n) in ( 2 ), 
we can solve for an explicit solution of g(m) to yield :  
( )rmm? d+b-d= lnlnln
1
)(                                                                                      ( 5 )  
where    
))(1(
)(
BABR
GRGA
p-pa-
p-pa
ºb                                                                                           ( 6 ) 
and d = da dr  as defined earlier.   Next, we note that depending on the parameters, b, da  and dr, 
g(m) may be less than zero or greater than m.  (A full characterization of g(m) in provided in 
the Appendix).  The optimal majority rule N(m) is therefore defined as follows: 
( ){ }( ))(0,Max,MinInt)( mmmN gº                                          ( 7 ) 
where Int( x ) denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.   
  In Section 5, I will show that if the marginal decision cost is constant at each stage, 
the optimal decision architecture is characterized by a probability range (qr(m), qa(m)), and an 
equivalent pair of majority rules {Nr(m), Na(m)}, where Nr(m) < N(m) < Na(m), for m = 1, …, 
M–1.  If the number of approvals exceeds Na(m), the project will be accepted, and if the 
number of approvals is fewer than Nr(m), the project will be rejected. Otherwise, an additional 
review is beneficial in terms of a higher expected net project payoff.  Since the maximum 
number of evaluations is set by M, it follows that Nr(M) = N(M) = Na(M).  Therefore, N(M) 
provides the decision rule for the case if the evaluation process were to reach stage M, the last 
possible evaluation stage. Furthermore, if managerial expertise is not fully deployed within 
the organization, so that marginal decision costs are zero, every project should be reviewed by 
all the M managers, so that N(M) is the optimal decision rule for the organization.   
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  Figure 1 illustrates the different possible variations for the optimal decision rule 
N(m), for different organizational sizes, when there are no variable costs.   
 
---------------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
4. The Quality of Organizational Decision-Making     
This section analyzes the optimal adjustment of the decision rule N(m) when changes 
occur in the quality of the investment environment and managerial expertise.  As will be 
shown in the next section, under the optimal sequential architecture, the pair of majority rules 
{Nr(m), Na(m)} bounds and tracks N(m), and converges to N(m) at m = M. 4  It follows that as 
the organization carry out adjustments to {Nr(m), Na(m)} in response to changes in the 
investment environment and managerial expertise, to maintain the optimality of the decision 
architecture, corresponding adjustments occur in N(m) as well.  Hence, an analysis of N(m) 
allows us to understand the qualitative aspects of the optimal adjustments of the optimal 
sequential architecture {Nr(m), Na(m)}.   
 
We begin by noting that there are two indicators of the quality of the investment 
environment: b (defined in ( 6 )) and Qc (defined in ( 4 )).  Firstly, b is the ratio of the 
expected payoff gains in the two states of the investment environment when the right 
decisions are made for each type of project.  It is straightforward to show that 
b > 1 corresponds to a situation when no evaluation is to be undertaken, always accepting 
projects is preferred. Similarly, when b < 1, this corresponds to a situation where if no 
evaluation is to be undertaken, always rejecting projects is preferred.  In this sense, b > 1 
describes a favorable investment environment while b < 1 describes a mediocre investment 
environment.  Lastly, b = 1 describes a neutral environment, in which the organization, 
without further information on a project, is indifferent towards pursuing every project (always 
accept) or not getting into business (always reject).  The objective of an economic  
organization, when faced with these different investment environments, is to decide if it 
should invest and acquire the ability to make informed decisions, rather than adopt naïve 
                                                 
4 This will be shown in Proposition 6 and illustrated in Figures 5, 6 and 7. 
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strategies of pursuing every project (always accept) or not getting involved in the business at 
all (i.e. always reject).   
   
Qc is another indicator of the quality of the investment environment; it is increasing in  
(pBR –  pBA) and decreasing in (pGA –  pGR).  Since a project will be considered for acceptance 
if the conditional probability P(m, n) is greater than Qc, it can be thought of as defining the 
threshold conditional quality for a project to be considered for acceptance.  Since P(m, g(m)) 
= Qc, it follows that g(m) is increasing in Qc, holding m constant; therefore, N(m) is non-
decreasing in Qc. The economic interpretation of Qc is that it measures the importance of 
making the right decision for each type of project. As the payoff differential of bad projects 
increases, making it relatively more important for the organization not to accept bad projects, 
the quality of the organizational decision-making, as represented by N(m), becomes more 
stringent; i.e. the bar for acceptance will be raised.  Similarly, as the payoff differential of 
good projects widens, the decision rule N(m), will be adjusted so that the likelihood of 
acceptance is improved.   
 
Clearly, changes in the investment environment and managerial expertise, affects 
N(m), and in turn, will impact the choice of the optimal organizational size M.  From Figure 
1, we note that if b ¹ 1,  the decision rule N(m) is trivially 0 or m when the organization is 
below a certain size.  For instance, (A) when b > 1 and M < Int ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
d
b
rln
ln , N(m) = 0 "  m M£  
and (B) when b <?1 and M < Int ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
d
b
-
aln
ln
, N(m) = m "  m M£ .  If the size of the 
management organization is set below the minimum level, project evaluation is clearly  un-
informative in the sense that under scenario (A), the decision rule is dominated by accepting 
all projects without evaluation and not incurring and any evaluation costs, while in scenario 
(B), rejecting all projects and not getting into business is the optimal course of action. When 
there are no marginal decision costs, we can state the following: 
Proposition 2: (a) When b > 1, the minimum size of the organization is Mmin = Int ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
d
b
rln
ln
, 
with an optimal decision rule N(Mmin) = 1; (b) When b < 1, the minimum size of the 
organization is Mmin = Int ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
d
b
-
aln
ln
, with an optimal decision rule N(Mmin) = Mmin.   
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The intuition for this result is that the investment environment and the quality of the 
managerial expertise creates a natural bias, in the absence of any evaluation, either to accept 
all projects when b > 1, or reject all projects – i.e. not to enter into business at all –when b < 
1.  Hence, under either scenario of the investment environment, the value of the initial 
evaluation is to generate information of sufficient value – in the sense that neither the 
“accept” nor “reject” decision is the dominant choice – to overcome this natural environment 
bias. The minimum organizational size simply indicates the smallest initial management team 
needed to produce informative evaluation to overcome the initial environmental bias.   
 
It is straightforward to see from Figure 1 that if the size of the management 
organization is fixed at the minimum size described in Proposition 2, then the basic 
management organization described in Proposition 2a is a polyarchy while the basic 
management organization described in Proposition 2b is a hierarchy5, in the sense defined in 
the introductory section of this paper. It is straightforward to see that the optimality of both 
the hierarchy and the polyarchy architectures are sensitive to slight variations in the 
organizationa l size , the investment environment as well as managerial expertise. Thus, unless 
the optimal size of the organization happens also to be the minimum organizational size 
described in Proposition 2, the hierarchy as well as the polyarchy is sub-optimal decis ion 
architectures.  Furthermore, if budgetary constraints force the organization to reduce its size 
below the minimum level required for informative evaluation in the sense discussed earlier, 
the hierarchy is dominated by not considering any investment, and the polyarchy is dominated 
by simply accepting all projects.  Therefore, the robustness of the hierarchy and the polyarchy 
as optimal decision architectures is weak, and the conditions for their optimality are very 
stringent.  While the literature has studied the comparative merits of these two sequential 
architectures, the analysis here illustrates that these architectures are generally non-optimal 
architectures if externally imposed on the organization6.    
 
The minimum organizational size stated in Propositions 2a and 2b applies strictly to 
the situation when marginal decision costs are zero. In situations where marginal decision 
costs are positive, the minimum organizational size will be larger when the optimal sequential 
decision architecture is implemented, as will be shown in Section 5.  Figure 6 illustrates that 
when b < 1, the minimum organizational size for a hierarchy will increase to Mamin, and each 
                                                 
5 Generally, the hierarchy and the polyarchy are feasible organizational structures for an 
organizational size of Mmin, and possibly for Mmin +1.   
6 The results presented here complement those in Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001b), which 
examined the robustness of the polyarchy and the hierarchy as optimal architectures.   
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project now requires at least Mamin  approvals before it is accepted.  Similarly, Figure 7 shows 
that when b > 1, the minimum organizational size for a polyarchy is also larger, given by 
Mrmin, and each project now requires at least Mrmin rejections before evaluation is terminated.  
The reason for the increase in the minimum organizational size for these two architectures 
follows from our earlier comment that the investment environment and the quality of 
managerial expertise creates a natural bias in favour of a naïve strategy of either accepting all 
or rejecting all projects.  If marginal decision costs are positive, the attractiveness of the naïve 
strategies becomes greater ex-ante, which translates into a larger minimum organizational size 
for informative evaluation to dominate the naïve strategies. 
 
 From the above discussion, it should be apparent that once the minimum 
organizational size is implemented, it does not make a difference if the project is initially 
reviewed in a sequential process or simultaneously, as in a committee setting, by the initial 
team of  Mmin managers.  Indeed, if speed in decision-making is desirable, due to, for instance, 
the existence of first-mover advantage (as discussed in Koh (1993)), it would be preferable 
for the initial review to be carried out simultaneously. The corollary, within the context of our 
model, is that re-organizing an existing strict sequential decision architecture into one that 
begins with an initial review carried out simultaneously by a team of the Mmin managers 
would potentially improve organizational performance.  We can state the following:  
Proposition 3:  In the project selection model, the initial review of the project will be carried 
out simultaneously by a team of Mmin managers, where Mmin = ÷÷
ø
ö
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Subsequent evaluation, if desired, will be carried out sequentially.   
Next, we analyze how the decision rule N(m) varies with the investment environment 
and the quality of managerial expertise.  This is carried out by obtaining the comparative 
statics for g(m), defined in ( 5 ). For the purpose of our analysis, and without loss to generality 
to the results, we shall consider N(m) as continuous, and conduct the analysis with g(m).  We 
make the further assumption that g(m) is twice continuously differentiable.  We provide the 
following derivatives for easy reference: 
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The derivative in ( 8 ) provides the marginal decision rule; i.e. for an increase in size 
of the economic organization, the corresponding optimal adjustment in the decision rule N(m).  
It is straightforward to see that the marginal decision rule will be a marginal majority rule, i.e. 
dmmd /)(g = 0.5, only if the probability of a manager accepting good or bad projects are 
equal, in i.e. g = b = 0.5.  Since g ³  b, Figure 2 shows the different combinations of g and b 
that result in 5.0
)(
<
>g
dm
md
.  
---------------------------------- 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
When marginal decision costs are zero, it is well-known that the simple (50%) 
majority rule is the optimal decision rule when b = 1 and da = dr (which requires that g = b = 
0.5) regardless of the size of the organization.  When managerial quality is unknown (or 
untested), it is reasonable to model such situations by assuming g = b = 0.5.  Thus, the 
marginal majority rule in this case is 0.5, so that N(M)/M®  0.5 as M ¥® , regardless of the 
quality of the investment environment.  In other words , as the size of the organization 
expands, the simple majority rule is approximately optimal regardless of the investment 
environment.  The corollary of this well-known result is that if the abilities of the decision-
makers are known or if the abilit ies of the managers improve – either in making “accept” or 
reject” decisions or both – a simple majority rule is invariably sub-optimal.  The organization 
would improve the quality of its decision process, and thereby enhance its profitability, if it 
takes into account these asymmetries and optimally utilize them in setting its decision rule. 
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Quality of investment environment   
As shown in ( 9 ), a better investment environment, as represented by a higher b, will 
lead the organization to optimally lower the majority required for accepting projects, but at a 
decelerating pace, ceteris paribus.  More interestingly, we note an improvement in b increases 
the minimum organizational size if b > 1, and reduces the minimum organizational size if 
b > 1.  The reasoning here is that when b > 1, an increase in b increases the desirability of 
accepting every project.  By raising the minimum organizational size required for informative 
evaluation, it leads potentially to a situation that unless the organization can obtain additional 
managerial resources to conduct the evaluation of the investment projects, the optimal 
strategy here may be to simply accept all projects, as the environmental bias makes the initial 
evaluation less desirable. 
 In the case where b < 1, when the quality of the investment environment improves – 
as represented by an increases in b - a smaller team is now required to conduct the initial 
evaluation of the project, thereby making it more attractive for new businesses of smaller 
minimum size to be established, if previously, it was uneconomical to do so.  Conversely, if 
the investment environment deteriorates, and firms differ in terms of their decision-making 
abilities, we should also see an exit of weaker, less profitable  firms from the industry; firms 
that remain are those who have better decision-making ability.  Similarly, if firms do not face 
the same investment environment, a general decline in the quality of the investment 
environment will negatively impact those firms who face investment environments below the 
industry average, while firms who face above-average investment environments specific to 
themselves will survive.   
 
One observation that is relevant to the preceding discussion is that in the wake of the 
bursting of the dotcom bubbles, many small venture capital firms, established in the last few 
years, have exited the industry; the venture capital firms that continue to do well are those that 
are recognized for their expertise and who have the pick of the best investment opportunities 
in the market.  Of course, other factors are at play as well, as these established top-tier firms 
have had a strong investment track record, and therefore have an advantage in terms of their 
access to investment funds, which is critical to continued operations. 
 
Quality of Managerial expertise  
Improvements in managerial expertise are captured by improvements in da and dr, 
which define the comparative skills in making “accept” and “reject” decisions.   The partial 
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derivatives in ( 10 ) indicate that the marginal decision rule will be tightened if the expertise 
in making “reject” decisions improves (as represented by an increase in dr), but will be made 
less stringent, if the expertise in making “accept” decisions improves (as represented by an 
increase in da).  Thus, the organization optimally adjusts the marginal decision rule to balance 
the organizational expertise in both the “accept’ and “reject” decisions, when managerial 
expertise in either area improves.  An increase in da or dr may be due to a rise in the 
probability of accepting good projects, g, or a decrease in the probability of accepting bad 
projects, b, or both.  The results in ( 11 ) and ( 12 ) can be explained similarly.   When the 
managerial ability to discriminate bad projects and make “reject” decisions  improves, the 
organization will optimally respond by setting tighter standards for approving projects, in the 
form of requiring a higher majority for acceptance.  Similarly, an improvement in the ability 
to discriminate and accept good projects leads to a less stringent decision rule.    
 
Furthermore, improvements in either da or dr also affect the minimum organizational 
size.  Suppose marginal decision costs are zero. In the case where b > 1, the minimum 
organizational size Mmin, would also be reduced if da improves, while in the case where b < 1, 
Mmin, would also be reduced if dr improves.  Thus, the improvement in managerial expertise is 
compensated by appropriate adjustments in both the minimum organizational size and the 
marginal decision rule.  In many organizations, it is generally the case that managerial 
expertise improves with on-the-job learning experience. In the context of the project selection 
model, if on-the-job experiences lead to better decision-making ability, then an organization 
should regularly adjust its quality of its decision-making processes, in order to ensure the 
decision-making process does not become overly stringent.  With the possibility of 
improvement in managerial expertise, we should also observe that organizations will start out 
initially with a stringent decision-making process; this is then gradually relaxed over time, as 
the ability to discriminate between good and bad projects improves.  
 
Furthermore, even though the investment environment may remain constant over 
time, as managerial expertise improves, the minimum organizational size to establish a 
business operation will also decrease, thus allowing for the entry of new firms into the 
industry, if it was previously unprofitable to do so.  Thus, if the promotion of competition is a 
desired policy objective for the governments, the analysis suggests that improving the overall 
level of industry expertise will serve to lower the barriers to entry as the minimum firm size 
will be reduced.  This suggests a potential linkage between an improvement in the quality of 
organizational decision-making and market structure. This is the subject of further research.  
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Again, drawing an observation from the private equity industry, the Singapore government’s 
Economic Development Board has recently mooted the idea to establish an Asia-Pacific 
Training Institute for Private Equity, with the objective of raising the level of expertise in the 
private equity industry, and encouraging the establishment of new venture capital firms in 
Singapore7.    
 
5. The Optimal Sequential Organizational Architecture  
In this section, we characterize optimal sequential decision architecture when 
marginal decision costs are positive8.  Define Am(P(m, n)) to be the expected project payoff if 
the decision is to proceed for an additional review, after m reviews has been carried out, and 
let the constant marginal decision cost be C.  The decision at stage m is to choose the action – 
accept, reject, proceed for another review – that maximizes the conditional expected payoff to 
the organization, given the project under review.  Denote                                         
                Vm(P(m, n)) º  Max {Za(P(m, n)),  Zr(P(m, n)),  Am(P(m, n)) – C}                     ( 13 ) 
The value function Vm(P(m, n)) describes the maximum expected payoff at stage m, given the 
evaluation history.  It follows then that  
   Am(P(m, n)) º  E[Vm+1(P(m +1, n + z m+1)]        z m+1Î{0 , 1}                              ( 14 ) 
where the expectation is taken over zm+1 with respect to the probabilities:                                                                                                                                 
 H(zm+1|P(m, n)) = P(m, n).G(zm+1|G) + (1 - P(m, n)).G(zm+1|B)                             ( 15 ) 
             H(z1| a) = aG(z1|G) + (1 - a)G(z1|B) 
where P(0, 0) = a  and G(1|G) = g, G(0|G) = (1 – g), G(1|B) = b, G(0|B) = (1 – b). For the rest 
of our analysis, we may on occasion suppress the variable n, and denote P(m, n) simply as p, 
to ease notation, unless otherwise indicated.  The following lemmas, with proofs contained in 
the Appendix , are used in the proof of Proposition 4. 
Lemma 1:  Vm(p) ³  Vm+1(p) and Am(p) ³  Am+1(p)     " m = 1, …, M–1 and p Î [0, 1] 
Lemma 29:  Vm(p) and Am(p) are convex in p.          " m = 1, …, M–1 and p Î [0, 1] 
                                                 
7  As reported in The Straits Times, Singapore, June 28, 2002. 
8 Formally, we shall assume the marginal decision costs are small relative to the potential 
payoff of selecting a good project and the minimum organizational size is feasible .  
9 We have assumed that pBR > pGR in our analysis, so that Zr(p) is decreasing in p. This 
assumption is not critical to the derivation of Proposition 4.  If pBR < pGR, this would then 
imply Zr(p) is increasing in p.  The critical conditions for our results are in Lemma 2, that 
Vm(p) and Am(p) are convex in p, " m = 1, …, M–1 and p Î [0, 1].   The assumption that pGA 
>  pBR  >  pGR > pBA implies Za(Qc)  = Zr(Qc) < pBR, with Qc defined in ( 4 ).  Propositions 4 
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Utilizing Lemmas 1 and 2, we prove in the Appendix, the following Proposition, which 
establishes the optimal sequential decision rule: 
 
Proposition 4:  At each stage m of the decision process, there exists two probability 
thresholds, an upper bound qa(m) and a lower bound qr(m), where qr(m) < Qc < qa(m) " m = 
1, …, M–1.  Also, qa(m)  is decreasing in m, qr(m)  is increasing in m and qa(M) = Qc = qr(M) 
as M defines size of the organization.  If P(m, n) > qa(m), the project is accepted and the 
evaluation ends; if P(m, n) < qr(m), the project is rejected and the evaluation stops.  If P(m, n) 
Î (qr(m), qa(m)), m  = 1, …, M-1, a further review should be carried out.  
 
The intuition behind the existence of the two probability thresholds and the 
probability range (qr(m), qa(m)) is straightforward. Suppose after the initial review by a team 
of Mmin  managers, the conditional probability that the project is a good project is close to one.  
Then the value of further evaluation – in terms of improving the expected organizational 
payoff – is lower compared with the case when the conditional probability is close to Qc, 
which defines the marginal case for considering acceptance.  When a further evaluation incurs 
a marginal cost, the optimal decision for the organization is to weigh the net gain in expected 
payoff from making a more informed decision against the cost of doing so.  A similar 
argument applies in the case when the conditional probability is close to zero. The probability 
thresholds –  qr(m) and qa(m) – define the cases where the value of additional evaluation is 
equal to the marginal decis ion cost. 
 
Figure 3 below provides an illustration of the general relationship between Am(p) – C, 
Vm(p), Za(p) and Zr(p) while Figure 4 provides an illustration of the probability range (qr(m), 
qa(m)), m = 1, …, M and the decision spaces at  each stage of the evaluation process10.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
FIGURES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
                                                                                                                                            
and 5 continue to hold if we assume pBR £  pGR.  In fact, if pBR £  pGR, it is straightforward to 
show that Vm(p) and Am(p) are increasing in p, " m = 1, …, M–1 and p Î [0, 1], and the 
results in this paper continue to hold.   
10 In order that our problem is non-trivial, we require that Am(1) – C > Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc).  
Otherwise, it is not worthwhile to become fully informed about the quality of the good 
project.  Graphically (see Figure 3), it implies that (Am(p) – C) intersects the right axis, when 
p = 1, at a level higher than Za(Qc).  This is necessary; otherwise, the sequential decision rule 
{Nr(m), Na(m)} would not exist, and the optimal decision is to always accept or always reject. 
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Corresponding to (qr(m), qa(m)) is an optimal sequential architecture {Na(m), Nr(m)}: 
Proposition 5:  At each stage m, there exists two majority rules – an upper bound Na(m) and a 
lower bound Nr(m), " m = 1, …, M–1.  By definition of M as the optimal organizational size, 
Na(M) = Nr(M) = N(M).  If the number of approvals exceeds Na(m), the project is accepted, 
and evaluation ends.  If the number of approvals falls below Nr(m), the project is rejected, and 
evaluation ends. Otherwise, an additional evaluation is beneficial.   
 
The existence of the sequential majority rules Nr(m)and Na(m) follows directly from the fact 
that, by definition, P(m, Nr(m)) = qr(m) and P(m, Na(m)) = qa(m), so that 
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From ( 16a ) and ( 16b ), there exist Mrmin and Mamin such that for m < Mrmin , Nr(m) = m and 
for m < Mamin , Na(m) = 0.  Routine calculation yields the following relationships : 
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Since both (Qc – qr(m)) and (qa(m) – Qc) are decreasing in m, it follows that  when m > Mrmin , 
(N(m) – Nr(m)) is decreasing in m; similarly, when m > Mamin , (Na(m) –  N(m)) is decreasing 
in m. Hence, both Na(m) and Nr(m) converge to N(m). More precisely, we are able to establish 
in Proposition 6 the following properties for {Nr(m), Na(m)} (see the Appendix for the proof): 
Proposition 6:  For m < M-1,   (a) Nr(m) + 
d
d
ln
ln r < Nr(m+1) < Nr(m) +1;  
(b) Na(m) < Na(m+1) < Na(m) + 
d
d
ln
ln r  
Using the properties of Nr(m) and Na(m) stated in Proposition 6, and beginning with the 
following relationships for stage (M-1) of the evaluation process, the explicit form of the 
 19 
decision rules Nr(m) and Na(m) can be derived recursively 11, (the derivation is contained in the 
Appendix) : 
 
)()(
C)(
)1M(
GRGABABR
BABR
p-p+p-p
+p-p
=-
gb
b
q r                             ( 18 ) 
 
))(1())(1(
C))(1(
)1M(
GRGABABR
BABR
p-p-+p-p-
+p-p-
=-
gb
b
q a                ( 19 ) 
 
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
-+-=-
dln
dln
)1M(
dln
ßln
Int)1M( rrrN  where { }{ }C)()1(
C)(
BABR
GRGA
+p-pa-
-p-paºb
b
g
r           ( 20 ) 
 
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
-+-=-
dln
dln
)1M(
dln
ßln
Int)1M( raaN where
{ }
{ }C))(1()1(
C))(1(
BABR
GRGA
+p-p-a-
-p-p-a
ºb
b
g
a   ( 21 )  
Figures 5, 6 and 7 provide, respectively, illustrations of the optimal sequential 
decision architecture for the cases when b = 1, b < 1 and b >1.  
 
----------------------------------------- 
FIGURES 5, 6, 7 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
In Section 3, we noted that in a neutral investment environment, i.e. when b = 1, the 
optimal decision architecture is potentially strictly sequential (i.e. starting the initial review 
with one manager), while in other cases, there is a minimum organizational size before project 
valuation can meaningfully improve decision-making (see Figure 1).  This is true only when 
the marginal decision costs are zero. When we consider the benefit of a further review, as 
represented by Am(p) – C, against the decision to accept or reject (as represented by Za(p) and 
Zr(p) respectively), the minimum organizational size will be larger than one even for the case 
when b = 1.  As illustrated in Figure 5, this is given by Mamin, so that after the initial review by 
the team of Mamin managers, the organization can decide if the project should be accepted or 
proceed for further review. In general, the minimum organizational size is given by 
Min{Mrmin, Mamin}.  This applies also in the case for b < 1 (see Figure 6) and b > 1 (see Figure 
7).  The intuition, as noted before, is that when marginal decision costs are positive, the 
attractiveness of a naïve strategy to accept or reject all projects becomes greater; thus, the 
                                                 
11   I have explored two approximations to the optimal decision rule: a myopic  one-step-look-
ahead decision rule (i.e. assuming that the only decision available in the next stage of 
evaluation is an “accept” or “reject” decision) and a linear approximation to the decision rule 
{Na(m), Nr(m)}, utilizing our knowledge of  Na(M-1), Nr(M-1) and N(M).  The performance 
of both approximations, in terms of the deviation from the optimal decision architecture, 
depends on the particular specifications of the model. 
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threshold for informative evaluation, as reflected in an increase in the minimum 
organizational size, is raised.   
 
The marginal decision costs  
From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the optimal sequential decision 
architecture and the desirability of additional evaluation, as represented by the probability 
range (qr(m), qa(m)), m = 1, …M, depends on the magnitude of the marginal decision cost.  
While we have assumed that marginal decision costs are constant in the analysis, the results 
generalize to situations where the marginal decision costs are increasing with the stage of the 
evaluation, as would be the case where senior managers face multiple demands on their time, 
or when further delay in decision-making may adversely affect the organization’s chances of 
investing in the project. The impact of increasing marginal decision costs will make the 
probability range (qr(m), qa(m)) tighter at later stages of the evaluation, and correspondingly, 
the likelihood of an additional evaluation is reduced.  In general, an increase in C will lead to 
a narrowing of the probability range (qr(m), qa(m)) )," m = 1, …, M–1, so that the expected 
number of evaluations of a project will become smaller.   
 
Conversely, if there is a reduction the marginal decision cost, the expected number of 
evaluations will increase, since the relative benefit of an additional evaluation increases.  In 
the limit when the marginal decision cost C tends to zero, it is routine to verify that Am(0) ®  
pBR, Am(1) ®  pGA, so that qr(m) ®  0 and qa(m) ®1.  Therefore, the probability range (qr(m), 
qa(m)) converges to (0, 1).  Intuitively, additional reviews of the project are always desirable 
if they do not incur marginal decision costs to the organization.  In the limit, the optimal 
organizational architecture converges to a fixed-size committee of size M, with a simple 
majority decision rule of N(M), and each project undergoes M reviews in a committee.   
 
When the optimal sequential decision rule {Nr(m), Na(m)} is implemented in each 
organization, the strategy to solve for the optimal organizational size is to compare the 
expected payoff of different organizations and select the organizational size that provides the 
highest expected terminal payoff less the expected evaluation costs. An explicit solution of 
the optimal organizational size M requires further specification of the model12.   
                                                 
12 We can derive an upper bound to the size of the management organization.  Let B(M) 
denote the (unconditional) gross expected payoff to the organization when the optimal 
sequential decision architecture {Nr(m), Na(m)} is implemented. Note that B(M) < apGA  +  
(1-a)p BR, as this occurs only if the quality of each project can be ascertained perfectly.   
Under the optimal sequential decision rule, the expected number of evaluations for a project is 
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6. Concluding Comments  
In this paper, we have characterized the optimal sequential decision architecture   
when marginal decision costs are positive. We also note that the quality of the investment 
environment and the level of managerial expertise entail a minimum organizational size, in 
order that project evaluation is informative and is not dominated by a simple strategy of 
always accepting projects or always rejecting projects.  In our analysis, we have not 
considered several issues that are clearly important in understanding the optimal design of 
organizations. For instance, we have not considered the possibility of managers investing in 
acquiring skills or a better understanding of the investment environment, that could aid in 
improving the ir expertise in evaluating and choosing projects.  This issue is important when 
the size of the organization is constrained, as the economic organization will direct managers 
to optimally adjust their decision criteria in response to changes in the investment 
environment.  Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1998) and Koh (1992b, 1994a) have studied this 
aspect of collective decision-making in organizations.  
 
While our analysis considered the case that evaluation at each stage is undertaken by 
one manager, we can generalize the results to situations where the decision at each stage is 
undertaken by a committee.  This has the effect of quickening the decision process, reduce the 
risk that other rival firms will adopt the project earlier – which may adversely impact its 
chances of success should it decide to pursue the same investment opportunity, as is the case 
in most venture capital investments where the first-mover advantage may be significant.    
                                                                                                                                            
smaller than M.  Assuming other costs of the organization are K, the optimal organizational 
size M* satisfies  M* < {B(M) – K}/C < {(apGA + (1-a)pBR) -K}/C. 
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Appendix  
 
Characterization of  g(m), for the illustration in Figure 1 :   
From ( 5 ), we note the following:  
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Proof of Lemma 1: We first show that if Vm(p) ³  Vm+1(p) is true for some m, then Vm-1(p) ³  
Vm(p).  Suppose Vm(p) ³  Vm+1(p), we have Am-1(pm-1) = E[Vm(pm)]  ³   E[Vm+1(pm)] = Am(pm-1).  
Therefore,  
   Vm-1(pm-1)   =   Max { Za(pm-1), Zr(pm-1), Am-1(pm-1) – C } 
                                  ³   Max { Za(pm-1), Zr(pm-1), Am(pm-1)  – C  } 
                     =  Vm(pm-1) 
Next, we show that VM-1(p) ³  VM(p).  This is obvious, by the definition of the fact that M 
denotes the maximum number of evaluations,   
  VM-1(pM-1)  =   Max { Za(pM-1), Zr(pM-1), AM-1(pM-1) – C }  
                     ³    Max { Za(pM-1), Zr(pM-1) }  
                     =   VM(p M-1)  
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Proof of Lemma 2:   
First, it is obvious that VM(p) is convex is p since it is the maximum of two linear functions, 
Za(p) and Zr(p).  Assume there exists some m such that Vm+1(p) is convex in p. First, note that  
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and G(1|G) = g, G(0|G) = (1 – g), G(1|B) = b, G(0|B) = (1 – b). To show the convexity of 
Am(p) in p, " m = 1, …, M–1 and p Î [0, 1], it is sufficient to show that Am(p) is convex in p 
in he above expression.  Indeed, assume Vm+1(p) is convex in p for some m.  To demonstrate 
the convexity of U(zm| p) in p and therefore the convexity of Am(p) in p, we must show that 
for every l Î [0, 1], and p1 and p2 Î [0, 1], we must have  
lU(zm+1| p1) +(1-l )U(zm+1| p2)  ³  U(zm+1|l p1 + (1-l) p2) 
This expression can be rewritten, suppressing the subscript for z, to be 
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where )|( pzH is defined in ( 15 ). The relationship as derived above is implied by our 
assumption that Vm+1(p) is convex in p.  If Am(p) is convex in p, it follows that since Vm(p) is 
the maximum of three convex functions, it is also convex in p.   
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Proof of Proposition 4:   
First, we note that as p ®1, Am(p) ®  Za(1) = pGA; similarly, as p ®  0, Am(p) ®  Zr(0) = 
pBR , " m = 1, …, M.  This is clearly seen from the formula given for Am(p) in the proof of 
Lemma 2.  In Footnote 11, we noted that one of the condit ions we need to assume, in order 
that our problem is non-trivial, is that Am(1) – C > Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc).  Otherwise, it is not 
worthwhile to become informed about the quality of a good project. Furthermore, we have 
Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc) < Am(0), by our assumption that pBR ³  pGR.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
relationship.  Since M denotes the organizational size, no further reviews should be carried 
out if a project reaches the Mth stage, and a decision to accept or reject needs to be taken.  By 
its definition, we have  
AM(Qc) – C = Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc) so that VM(Qc) =  Max {Za(Qc), Zr(Qc)}.   
Next, we note from Lemma 2, that  Am-1(p) ³  Am(p), so that for stage M-1, we would have      
AM-1(Qc) – C > Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc) 
Since Za(p) and Zr(p) are linear, and Am(p) is convex in p, with Am(1) – C > Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc) 
and Am(0) > Za(Qc) = Zr(Qc), it is straightforward to see that the function {AM-1(p) – C} 
intersects the function Max{Za(p), Zr(p)} at two points, (qa(M-1), Za(qa(M-1))) and     
(qr(M-1), Zr(qr(M-1))) so that  
AM-1(qa(M-1)) – C =  Za(qa(M-1))    
AM-1(qr(M-1)) – C =  Zr(qr(M-1))     
and  qr(M-1) <  Qc < qa(M-1).  Thus, if P(M-1, n) Î (qr(M-1), qa(M-1)), requesting for 
another review of the project is the correct decision.    
Next, utilizing Lemma 2, it follows that the probability range (qr(m), qa(m)) narrows 
as m increases and converges to zero at m = M, since by definition, M denotes the final stage 
of evaluation when it is reached.  Since Am-1(p) ³  Am(p) for p ¹ 0 or 1, it is obvious that qa(m) 
is decreasing in p and qr(m) is increasing in p.  
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Proof of Proposition 6:  To prove that for m = 1, …, M-1, (a) Nr(m) +
d
d
ln
ln r < Nr(m+1) < 
Nr(m) +1.  First, we note from Proposition 4 that  qr(m) is increasing, so that  qr(m) < qr(m+1); 
this implies P(m, Nr(m)) < P(m+1, Nr(m+1)).  Using the definition of P(m, n) in ( 2 ), it is 
routine to show that Nr(m) + 
d
d
ln
ln r < Nr(m+1).  Next, to show that Nr(m+1) < Nr(m) +1, 
suppose that nm+1 £  Nr(m+1).  This implies that Vm+1(P(m+1, nm+1)) = Zr(P(m+1, nm+1)) 
and Vm+1(P(m+1, nm))  = Zr(P(m+1, nm)).   This in turn implies, using ( 14 ) and ( 15 )  to take 
conditional expectation, that Am(P(m, nm)) = Zr(P(m, nm)).  Therefore, we have Vm(P(m, nm)) 
= Zr(P(m, nm)).  Since this is true for nm < Nr(m), it follows from our assumption that nm+1 £  
Nr(m+1) that  nm+1 £   Nr(m+1) < Nr(m) +1.   
Next, to prove that for m = 1, …, M-1, (b) Na(m) < Na(m+1) < Na(m) + 
d
d
ln
ln r .  
Again, we note from Proposition 4 that qa(m) is decreasing, so that  qa(m) > qa(m+1); this 
implies P(m, Na(m)) > P(m+1, Na(m+1)). Similarly, using the definition of P(m, n) in ( 2 ), it 
is routine to show that Na(m+1) < Na(m) + 
d
d
ln
ln r . Next, to show that Na(m) < Na(m+1), 
suppose that nm ³  Na(m+1). This implies that Vm+1(P(m+1, nm+1)) = Za(P(m+1, nm+1)) and 
Vm+1(P(m+1, nm))  = Za(P(m+1, nm)).  This in turn implies, using ( 14 ) and ( 15 )  to take 
conditional expectation, Am(P(m, nm)) = Za(P(m, nm)).  Therefore, we have Vm(P(m, nm)) = 
Za(P(m, nm)).  Since this is true for nm > Na(m), it follows from our assumption that nm ³  
Na(m+1) that nm ³  Na(m+1) > Na(m).  
 
 
Derivation of the results in ( 18 ) to ( 21 ):  Consider the case for qr(M-1).  By definition, 
qr(M-1) = P(M-1,  Nr(M-1)).  Using Proposition 6a, and noting that Nr(M) = Na(M), it 
follows that VM(P(M,  Nr(M-1)+1)) = Za(P(M,  Nr(M-1)+1)) and VM(P(M,  Nr(M-1)) = 
Zr(P(M, Nr(M-1)).  Next, using ( 14 ) and ( 15 ), and writing qr(M-1) as rq 1M- for short,   
     BR1MGR1MBA1MGA1M1M1-M )1)(1()1()1()( pppp bqgqbqgqqA
rrrrr --+-+-+= -----    
Noting that ))1M(( C))1M((1-M -³--
r
r
r qZqA , we derive the results in ( 18 ) and ( 19 ).  
The derivation for ( 20 ) and ( 21 ) is similarly carried out.  
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Figure 1: 
 
The optimal decision rule for an accept-reject decision  
N(m) = Int( Min {m, Max{0, g(m)}} ) 
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Figure 2: 
 
The conditions for g and b under which the marginal decision rule  
is greater or less than 0.5  
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Figure 3:  
 
An illustration of the general relationship between  
Am(p), Vm(p), Za(p) and Zr(p)  
 
                                           Vm(p) º  Max {Za(p), Zr(p), Am(p) – C}    
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Figure 4:  
 
An illustration of the relationship between Qc and  
the probability range (qr(m), qa(m))  
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Figure 5: 
 
An illustration of the optimal sequential decision architecture {Nr(m) Na(m)}   
when b = 1 
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Figure 6: 
 
An illustration of the optimal sequential decision architecture {Nr(m) Na(m)}   
when b < 1 
 
 
N(m)  
 
                    Mrmin         Mamin                                                                  M 0 
Na(m) 
Nr(m) 
Reject 
Accept 
Further 
review 
 34 
Figure 7: 
 
An illustration of the optimal sequential decision architecture {Nr(m) Na(m)}   
when b > 1 
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